

Dynamic Permissivism

There has been considerable philosophical debate in recent years over a thesis called *epistemic permissivism*. According to the permissivist, it is possible for two agents to have the exact same total body of evidence and yet differ in their belief attitudes towards some proposition, without either being irrational. However, I will argue, not enough attention has been paid to the distinction between different ways in which permissivism might be true. In this paper, I will present a taxonomy of forms of epistemic permissivism framed as the upshot of different ways one might respond to a basic argument against the view from Roger White. I will then introduce a new type of permissive view which the contemporary debate has completely ignored. This view permits differences in belief between evidential equals by rejecting *static* norms connecting an agent's rational behavior to their evidence in favor of *dynamic* norms governing their processes of consideration. I'll show how the dynamic strategy of rejecting static norms on belief opens the door to a new kind of permissivism which is both independently attractive and especially well-placed to answer worries that have been raised against traditional permissivist views.